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Comments
LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL
DENATIONALIZATION AFTER AFROYIM
This Comment discusses the constitutional aspects of loss of
United States citizenship. It contrasts expatriation with proce-
dures developed by the state in treaty and statute for involuntary
deprivation of citizenship. It distinguishes early judicial and leg-
islative debate over the existence of a citizen's constitutionally
guaranteed right to forfeit his citizenship with the twentieth-cen-
tury controversy surrounding unilateral government action to de-
nationalize. Examining existing statutes in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions limiting congressional authority in this
area, it suggests an analysis of contemporary statutory presump-
tions based upon the relationship of proscribed activity and alle-
giance.
INMRODUCTION
"Damn the United States! I wish I may never hear of the
United States again!"'
His wish was promptly granted by the military court which
committed young Phillip Nolan into seagoing exile as the man
without a country. Although a work of fiction, Edward Everett
Hale's story of an early expatriate illustrates a recurring issue in
the American law of citizenship.2 By its order, was the court
1. E. HALE, THE MAN WrrHOT A COUNTRY 8 (1960).
2. Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of alle-
giance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of society.
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9,22 (1913). See text accompanying note 151 supra.
Insofar as the relationship exists between an individual and a particular nation-
state, citizenship and nationality are largely synonymous, and the two terms will
be used interchangeably throughout this Comment. "The term 'national' means a
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granting Nolan's request or passing his sentence?3 Was the state
merely fulfilling the wish of an individual who desired to sever his
relationship with his native land, or was it by flat confiscating No-
lan's birthright of citizenship? Fashioned in more general terms,
to what extent may the national government relieve a citizen of
his nationality without his consent?4
This Comment will address that issue, focusing on the power of
Congress to legislate loss of citizenship as a consequence of spe-
cific acts performed by individual citizens. Because the concur-
rence of the individual has become a key factor in modern
denationalization debate,5 the issue of how that concurrence may
be expressed has also become significant. In Afroyim v. Rusk,6
the United State Supreme Court concluded that unilateral depri-
vation of citizenship by the government is beyond the constitu-
tional limits of congressional power.7 The Court, however, has
left undefined the scope of the authority of the Legislature to in-
terpret an individual's action as signifying an intent to abjure alle-
giance. It remains an open question what action by the
individual, short of an express expatriating declaration, is suffi-
cient to support the inference by Congress that he desires to
sever his tie with the state. Congress has by statute attached
such inference to a variety of specific acts.8 The performance of
any one of these acts, by an individual otherwise silent on the
person owing permanent allegiance to the state. The term 'national of the United
States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not
a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940, § 101(a) (21), (22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (21),
(22) (1976). "Nationality" in its broadest consideration means membership in a
certain nation which is held together by definite common ethnical, physical, edu-
cational, religious, or racial ties or characteristics. See E. SEcKLER-Hunso,
STATELEssNEss: wrrT SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES 6 (1934). See also
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
3. Admittedly, it is the title of Hale's work and not the order of the military
court that he created therein that suggests that Nolan suffered loss of citizenship
and creates the memorable symbol of a stateless person. Denationalization as a
punishment was found unconstitutional in Irop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). See
text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
4. Denationalization is a process by which citizenship is lost. When citizen-
ship is voluntarily surrendered, it is expatriation. Gordon, The Citizen and the
State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L. J. 315, 316
(1965). "Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality
and allegiance." Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939). Both denationalization
and its subset expatriation should be distinguished from denaturalization, "the ac-
tion by the sovereign to nullify in fact a purported status of citizenship which has
never existed in law." Roche, Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951, 13 U. Prrr L.
REV. 276, 279 (1952). See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 23-24 (1913). See also J.
CABLE, DECISIVE DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP 85 (1967).
5. See text accompanying notes 51-125 infra.
6. 387 U.S. 253 (1966).
7. See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 130-35 infra.
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subject of his allegiance,9 is sufficient to trigger loss of citizenship
by expatriation. When Congress attaches such significance to an
act that does not create for the actor an alternate foreign alle-
giance, this author submits, the legislature exceeds its constitu-
tional authority.
The contemporary question of under what circumstances a gov-
ernment can denationalize its citizens can be distinguished from
the issues that generated much of the early debate in all three
branches of government. For over a hundred years, the key ques-
tion with respect to loss of citizenship was whether the individual,
not the state, had the power to sever the bond of allegiance that
tied him to the nation of his birth.O Governmental authority to
terminate an individual's citizenship was only tangentially in-
volved. In this century, however, the spotlight has shifted from
expatriation to denationalization." The development of the law
pertaining to loss of citizenship is relevant, nevertheless, for what
it reveals of the significance of voluntary denationalization as an
individual right and the parallel development of involuntary dena-
tionalization as a legislative alternative.
Loss OF CrIZENSHIP PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR: COMMON LAw AND
STATES' RIGHTS COMPLICATIONS
The question of whether a citizen could sever his allegiance to
the state first became a source of controversy in the United States
when the Revolutionary War stimulated American thought on
matters of national allegiance.12 *The right of expatriation had not
9. "[Allegiance] is the obligation of fidelity and obedience to the government
in consideration for the protection that government gives." United States v. Kuhn,
49 F. Supp. 407, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 144 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1944). Blackstone defined allegiance as the obligation of a subject to be faithful to
his kind and to defend him against all his enemies. 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, CoMIENTA-
RiEs *366. "Allegiance and protection are... reciprocal obligations. The one is a
compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for alle-
giance." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166 (1874).
10. See text accompanying notes 12-56 infra.
11. The distinction is not always honored in the statutes in question. Con-
gress persists in legislating loss of citizenship under the heading of expatriation
when it would more appropriately be considered denationalization. See text ac-
companying notes 51-60, 129-33 infra.
12. Allegiance became an issue only somewhat belatedly. At first, popular un-
rest in the colonies was perceived in terms of resistance to the English Parliament
but not to the sovereign to whose person allegiance was owed throughout the em-
pire. This view eventually gave way to one involving severance of allegiance as
revolutionary rhetoric took hold and the schism assumed more profound dimen-
been recognized by the common law.' 3 Allegiance, like the natu-
ral law from which it was derived, was considered immutable and
perpetual. 14 The American Declaration of Independence,15 how-
ever, established that the colonies no longer embraced the notion
of perpetual allegiance to the sovereign. What was not clear from
the language of the document was by whom the termination could
be effected. 16 Allegiance could be severed, but it remained an
open question whether such power belonged to the individual or
the state.'7
sions. L TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, at 11
n.1 (1942).
13. Although it is not certain whether English law recognized the right of the
individual to sever his allegiance to the state prior to 1608, see I. TSLANG, supra
note 12, at 11 n.1, the decision in Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608), set-
tled the question for the next two and a half centuries. The issue involved in Cal-
vin's Case was whether one born in Scotland during the reign of James I was an
alien, unable to hold English land. Blackstone wrote:
[I]t is a principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one
prince cannot by any act of his own-no, not by swearing allegiance to an-
other-put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this
natural allegiance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the
other; and cannot be divested without the concurrent act of that prince to
whom it was first due. Indeed, the natural-born subject of one prince, to
whom he owes allegiance, may be entangled by subjecting himself abso-
lutely to another but it is his own act that brings him into these straights
and difficulties, of owing service to two masters; and it is unreasonable
that by such voluntary act of his own, he should be able at pleasure to un-
loose those bonds by which he is connected to his natural prince.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *369. See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Har-
bor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 159 (1830) (Story, J., concurring). Such is no longer the law
in England and Wales. See note 46 supra.
14. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608); Kettner, The Development of
American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance,
18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208, 209 (1974).
15. Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776.
16. Id.
17. The seemingly obvious theoretical'answer foundered on its practical con-
sequences for a revolutionary government. If expatriation were recognized, it
would be difficult to justify sanctions imposed on Loyalists for their individual
choices to adhere to crown allegiance. This was the argument later raised by Al-
exander Hamilton who believed expatriation to be a principle contrary to law and
subversive of government. F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-6 (1906); Kettner, note 14 supra; Morrow, The Early
American Attitude Toward the Doctrine of Expatriation, 30 Am. J. INT'L L. 647
(1936).
If, on the other hand, the rationale was adopted that the Declaration of Indepen-
dence evidenced the action of colonial governments, not individuals, see Inglis v.
Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830), then treason indict-
ments still awaited those colonists who had engaged in revolutionary activity prior
to official action by their legislatures, should those individuals again come under
British control. See Kettner, supra note 14, at 238-41.
The practical problems were solved by the two nations by stipulation in Jay's
Treaty of 1794, wherein an individual right of election of allegiance was recognized
by both sides without reaching the theoretical question of expatriation. Jay's
Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105; Shanks v. Dupont,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 247 (1830). The extraordinary circumstances of the revolution
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In the years between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War,.
the question of whether this country would recognize a personal
right to terminate allegiance evolved into separate issues distin-
guishable by their context. One involved the application of the
expatriation principle to an immigrant seeking United States sup-
port in his or her attempt to avoid the civil obligations of a prior
national allegiance. The other involved would-be American expa-
triates seeking to avoid the demands of their previous allegiance
to the United States. 8 Rarely were both issues considered in the
same context, and contradictory signals emanated from the three
branches of the national government.
Congress considered expatriation on numerous occasions,19
particularly in the course of legislating naturalization. Attempts
to make national law, however, were unsuccessful. 20 The failure
of Congress to supply a statutory answer can be attributed not
only to congressional disagreement on the basic issue of an indi-
vidual right to terminate allegiance, but also to the deep division
within the Legislature concerning the political issue of states'
rights.21 With the exception of the constitutional mandate to
Congress to establish a system of naturalization, citizenship had
been generally regarded as an area primarily within the purview
of the states. 22 A national statute governing loss of citizenship
made necessary a one-time personal choice of allegiance exercised within a rea-
sonable period of time and binding once made. Kettner, supra note 14, at 225.
18. E. BORCHARD, THE DrPLOMATIc PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD § 315
(1915); Gordon, supra note 4, at 317-22; Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes
There the Man with Soul So Dead.. .?", 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 325, 327-29.
19. The issue first came up during debate of the Naturalization Act of 1795, ch.
20, 1 Stat. 414, When an amendment was proposed which would have placed na-
tional restrictions on regaining citizenship by one who had expatriated himself.
After some debate, it was withdrawn. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1005 (1795). In 1797, a
bill was briefly considered which would have regarded as expatriated a citizen
who entered the service of any foreign prince of state. 7 ANNAis OF CONG. 349
(1797). In 1808, a bill was offered providing that all citizens would be considered
such only while they actually resided in the country and that any citizen who ex-
patriated himself would be deemed an alien. 18 ANNALs OF CONG. 1841 (1808). The
manner in which American citizens might expatriate themselves was addressed in
a bill tabled in 1814. 5 T. BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS,
1789-1856, at 160-62 (1857-61). Finally, a bill in 1817 defined expatriation in terms of
a declaration made to a federal court followed by emigration. 31 ANNALS OF CONG.
1035 (1817).
20. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1030-1105 (1817).
21. See the partisan historical reviews presented by each side of a split
Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1966) (Black, J., majority opinion,
257-61) (Harlan, J., dissenting, 271-80).
22. F. FRANmuN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURAIZATION IN THE UNITED
was, therefore, in the eyes of many, yet another challenge to
states' rights. 23
Absent statutory endorsement of a personal right to sever alle-
giance, it is not surprising that the Executive equivocated in its
support of the principle of expatriation in the international fo-
rum.24  The diplomatic protection of naturalized Americans
abroad often ceased when they visited the nation from which they
had emigrated.25 Preoccupied with its duty of protecting Ameri-
cans overseas, the Executive narrowed its focus on expatriation
to its exercise by a new citizen seeking freedom from an old alle-
giance.26 By contrast, the Supreme Court was presented with the
issue of whether an American could abjure his American citizen-
ship.27 Although it sometimes displayed a predilection for the
STATES 134-66" (1906); Morrow, The Early American Attitude Toward the Doctrine of
Expatriation, 30 AM. 3. INT'L L 647 (1936).
23. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1030, 1039 (speech by Rep. Robertson of Louisiana),
1046 (speech by Rep. Pindall of Virginia), 1058 (speech by Rep. McLane of Dela-
ware) (1817); see Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man with
Soul So Dead.. .?" 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 325, 329.
24. CMTZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES, EXPATRIATION AND PROTECTION
ABROAD, H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1907) [hereinafter cited as
CITIZENSHIP]; E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
§ 356 (1915); L TSIANG, supra note 12, at 71-82.
25. Henry Wheaton, Minister of Prussia, wrote to a Prussian-born naturalized
American: "Having returned to the country of your birth, your native domicile and
national character revert (so long as you remain in the Prussian dominions), and
you are bound in all respect to obey the laws exactly as if you had never emi-
grated." Quoted in CrriZENSHIP, supra note 24, at 10.
At the other end of the spectrum, Secretary of State Cass wrote to one of Whea-
ton's successors:
The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized, his allegiance to his native
country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad
and impassable line separates him from his native country. He is no more
responsible for anything he may say or do, or omit to say or do, after as-
suming his new character than if he had been born in the United States.
Should he return to his native country, he returns as a citizen, and in no
other character.
Letter from Cass to Wright (July 8, 1859) in 52 State Papers 1331, quoted in 1.
TSIANG, supra note 12, at 81. See, e.g., the opinion of Attorney General Black in
1859 concerming one Christian Ernst-
The natural right of every free person, who owes no debts and is not guilty
of any crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an hon-
est purpose, the privilege of throwing off his natural allegiance and substi-
tuting another allegiance in its place-the general right, in one word, or
expatriation, is incontestable.
9 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 357-58 (1859).
26. Secretary of State Marshall wrote to the U.S. Envoy to London in 1800:
With the naturalization of foreigners no other nation can interfere further
than the rights of the other are affected ... consequently those persons
who, according to our laws, are citizens, must be so considered by Britain,
and by every other power not having a conflicting claim to the person.
Quoted in CITzENSHIP, supra note 24 at 7.
27. In the first case involving expatriation to reach the Supreme Court, each
member involved in the decision wrote a separate opinion (Justice Wilson took no
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common law principle of perpetual allegiance,28 the Court repeat-
edly sidestepped the issue.2 9
The inability of the national government to come to grips with
the two-edged issue of expatriation passed with the Civil War and
the emergence of the immigrant as a political force at the polls. 3 0
Congress legislated in the last days of the war on the question of
American expatriation.3 l Soon afterward, both Congress and the
state department recognized expatriation as the personal right of
immigrants entering the United States.32
EARLY EXPATRIATION STATuTES AND TREATIES
The first statute governing denationalization was passed by
Congress on March 3, 1865,33 and provided that Union deserters
and draft evaders "shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily
relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship and their
rights to become citizens .... ."34 Shortly thereafter, Congress
part in the case). Justice Patterson addressed the question most forthrightly but
concluded that expatriation could not occur as a result of an act of illegality. Tal-
bot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 152 (1795). Chief Justice Rutledge and Justice
Cushing agreed that the issue of expatriation need not be reached. Id. at 168-69.
Justice Iredell, who was uncertain whether the issue need be addressed, neverthe-
less opined that expatriation was subject to congressional regulation. Id. at 162-63.
28. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 159
(1830) (Story, J., concurring); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830).
29. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120
(1804); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808); The Santis-
sima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 346 (1822); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
242, 246-47 (1830).
A district court suffered from no such reticence in 1818. District Judge Van Ness
stated:
In this country expatriation is conceived to be a fundamental right. As far
as the principles maintained, and the practice adopted by the government
of the United States is evidence of its existence it is fully recognized. It is
constantly exercised, and has never in any way been restrained. The gen-
eral evidence of expatriation is actual emigration, with other concurrent
acts showing a determination and intention to transfer his allegiance.
Juando v. Taylor, 13 F. Cas. 1179, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 7,558) (frequently cited
as Stoughton v. Taylor, 2 Paine 652).
30. Gordon, supra note 4, at 322.
31. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
33. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490-91. Its most recent embod-
iment, at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1976), was repealed by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046, following the adverse ruling of the Supreme Court in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Court relates the history of the
statute beginning at 170).
34. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490-91. Although the language
of the statute reads "rights of citizenship" and a distinction elsewhere generally
passed the Expatriation Act of 186835 which recognized "the right
of expatriation as a natural and inherent right of all people, indis-
pensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness." 36 The Act declared that executive pro-
nouncements which impaired expatriation were inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of the American government 37 and
guaranteed to naturalized citizens the same diplomatic protection
as was afforded the native-born. 38
The Act of 1868 was a guarantee made by Congress to natural-
ized American citizens.39 The United States government would
intercede on behalf of a naturalized American who, during a visit
to his homeland, was called upon to perform duties arising from
his previous allegiance.40 In that sense, the legislation provided
direction for the Executive, particularly the Department of State.
The diplomatic protection of Americans abroad would no longer
exists between loss of citizenship and loss of civil rights, Gathings, Loss of Citizen-
ship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime, 43 Ame. PoL Sci. REV. 1228 (1949),
the courts have treated the statute as affecting loss of citizenship itself. Severance
v. Healey, 50 N.H. 448, 451 (1870); Gotcheus v. Matheson, 58 Barb. 152, 154 (N.Y.
1870); Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112, 114 (1866). See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 281 (1967) (Harlan J., dissenting).
35. Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868), superseded by the Expatriation Act of 1907, ch.
2534, 34 Stat. 1228, superseded by the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat.
1168. Section 401 was reenacted as § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 267 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976)), as amended by the
Expatriation Act of 1954, ch. 1256, 68 Stat. 1146; Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-
301, § 17, 75 Stat. 650, 656; the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412,
90 Stat. 1258; Act of Oct. 10, 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046.
36. Expatriation Act of 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
37. Id. § 1, at 224.
38. Id. § 2, at 224. Some doubts enshadow the significance of this legislation as
a statutory embodiment of an American's right to expatriation. Its language, see
id. § 3, at 224, and history clearly demonstrate that the primary purpose of the Act
was to assert a national position with respect to American protection of natural-
ized citizens abroad. E. BoRcHARD, THE DipLomATic PROTECTION OF CrrzENS
ABROAD § 315 (1915); I. TsLING, supra note 12, at 85-86; Gordon, supra note 4, at
323. Commentators differ on its impact with respect to the American citizen wish-
ing to loose the bonds of United States allegiance. See generally Borchard, Deca-
dence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25 Am. J. Irr'L L. 312
(1931); Hurst, Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?, 29 ROCKY MoUNTAIN L. REV.
62, 65 (1956). Roche looks at the title, "Act concerning the Rights of American Citi-
zens in Foreign States," and the placement of the expatriation endorsement in the
preamble and concludes that the Act of 1868 was "merely another affirmation of
the rights of foreign nationals to expatriate, ie., to become naturalized American
citizens... ." Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man with Soul
So Dead.. .?", 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 325, 330. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253,
264-66 (1966).
39. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 831 (1868) (comments by Rep.
Banks of Mass.); id. at 4207 (comments by Sen. Conness of Calif.); id. at 4446
(speech by Sen. Howard of Mich.). See also Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 559
(C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
40. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 831 (1868) (exchange bet-ween Rep.
Chandler of N.Y. and Rep. Banks of Mass.).
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be suspended when they returned to their native land.4 1 The re-
ciprocal thesis that the United States government must accede in
the decision to terminate allegiance made by one of its own citi-
zens was not as clearly established42 beyond the narrow confines
of treaty provisions to that effect.43
Even before Congress passed the Act of 1868, the Executive had
demonstrated a new postwar assertiveness in the international
arena regarding expatriation. In a treaty with the Prussian gov-
ernment of Bismarck, each nation recognized as an act of expatri-
ation the naturalization of a former citizen by the other country.4 4
A number of agreeements containing similar provisions governing
expatriation were soon concluded with other nations,45 including
41. See note 25 supra.
42. That the proposition with respect to expatriation by America's own citi-
zens was not self-evident to the judiciary is clear from the division among the
lower federal courts. Compare In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 908 (C.C.D. Cal.
1884), Charles Green's Son v. Salas, 31 F. 106 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887), and Jennes v.
Landes, 84 F. 73, 74-75 (C.C.D. Wash. 1897), with Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556,
558-59 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893). The Supreme Court said in the most passing of dicta in
Elk v. Wilkins that the Act of 1868 "affirms the right of every man to expatriate
himself." 112 U.S. 94, 107 (1884).
It was the opinion of Attorney General Williams in 1873 that "[t]he affirmation
by Congress [in the Expatriation Act of 1868], that the right of expatriation is a
neutral and inherent right of all people includes citizens of the United States as
well as others, and the Executive should give to it that comprehensive effect." 14
Op. ATr'Y GEN. 296 (1873). See also State v. Adams, 45 Iowa 99, 100-01 (1876).
43. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
44. "Citizens of the North German Confederation, who become naturalized cit-
izens of the United States of America and shall have resided uninterruptedly
within the United States five years, shall be held by the North German Confedera-
tion to be American citizens, and shall be treated as such." Reciprocally: "Citi-
zens of the United States of America who become naturalized citizens of the
North German Confederation, and shall have resided uninterruptedly within
North Germany five years, shall be held by the United States to be North German
citizens, and shall be treated as such." Naturalization Treaty, Feb. 22, 1868, United
States-North German Union, 15 Stat. 615, T.S. No. 261, quoted in C. BEVANS, TREA-
TIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1776-1949, at 71 (1971). See also CITIZENSHIP, supra note 24, at 12; E. BORCHARD,
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CrIIZENS ABROAD § 315 (1915); L TSIANG, supra
note 12, at 88-90.
45. Naturalization Convention, July 20, 1872, United States-Denmark, 17 Stat.
941, T.S. No. 69; Naturalization Treaty, May 6, 1872, United States-Ecuador, 18 Stat.
197, T.S. No. 78; Naturalization Convention, Sept. 20, 1870, United States-Austria-
Hungary, 17 Stat. 833, T.S. No. 12; Naturalization Treaty, May 26, 1869, United
States-Sweden-Norway, 17 Stat. 809, T.S. No. 350; Naturalization Treaty, Nov. 16,
1868, United States-Belgium, 16 Stat. 747, T.S. No. 24; Treaty of Peace, Amity, and
Commerce, July 28, 1868, United States-China, 16 Stat. 739, T.S. No. 48; Naturaliza-
tion Treaty, July 19, 1868, United States-Baden, 16 Stat. 731, T.S. No. 15; Naturaliza-
tion Treaty, July 10, 1868, United States-Mexico, 15 Stat 687, T.S. No. 213;
Great Britain.4 6
The year 1868 also marked the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment. 47 The first sentence of the amendment, "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside,"4 8 provided for the first time a constitutional
definition of national citizenship.49 It was to have a profound ef-
fect on expatriation law nearly a century later.5O
THE ACT OF 1907: CONGRESSIONAL DENATIONALIZATION UNDER THE
GUISE OF EXPATRIATION
In 1907, Congress responded to the uncertain state of expatria-
tion law by passing "the first general statute governing loss of
American citizenship." 5' The Act of 190752 provided for dena-
tionalization by an American citizen who underwent naturaliza-
tion in a foreign state or took a foreign oath of allegiance.53 A
rebuttable presumption of expatriation was created when a natu-
ralized American returned to live in his homeland for a period of
two years or elsewhere abroad for five years.54 American women
who married foreigners acquired the nationality of their hus-
bands.55
Naturalization and Extradition Treaty, July 10, 1868, United States-Wurttemburg,
16 Stat. 735, T.S. No. 375; Naturalization Treaty, May 26, 1868, United States-Bava-
ria, 15 Stat. 661, T.S. No. 18.
46. Naturalization Treaty, May 13, 1870, United States-United Kingdom, 16
Stat. 775, T.S. No. 130, supplemented by Renunciation of Naturalization Treaty,
Feb. 23, 1871, 17 Stat. 841, T.S. No. 132. Upon the recommendation of a royal com-
mission appointed by Parliament in 1868, a statute, The Naturalization Act of 1870,
33 Vict. 12, C. 14, § 7, was ultimately adopted which reintroduced expatriation to
British law, bringing to an end the influence of the decision in Calvin's Case. See
notes 13 & 14 supra; Newcomb v. Newcomb, 108 Ky. 582, 585, 57 S.W. 2d, 4-5 (1900).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. X=V.
48. Id. § 1. The language was adapted from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 27, which reads: 'That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States .... " J. CABLE, DECISIVE DECISIONS OF UNrrED
STATES CrrIZENSHP 30 (1967); Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15
AiZ. L. REv. 369, 373-74 (1973); Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The De-
velopment of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 26 (1950).
49. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 909 (1884). But see United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675-76 (1898). See also Bickel, Citizenship in the American
Constitution, 15 ARIz. L REv. 369, 372 (1973).
50. See text accompanying notes 113, 122-29 infra.
51. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality---The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 26 (1950).
52. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228. For subsequent legislative
history, see note 35 supra.
53. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 3.
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The Expatriation Act of 1907 brought about a subtle shift in the
legal debate that had surrounded loss of citizenship for over a
century. Until its passage, the question for both Congress and the
courts had been whether the individual could terminate an alle-
giance relationship.56 The Act of 1907 finally confirmed the exist-
ence of an individual right of expatriation for American citizens.
At the same time, however, the Act of 1907 reserved for the state
the power to infer an individual's assent to the loss of his or her
citizenship and to statutorily define the circumstances under
which that inference would be drawn. By legislating that certain
acts by the citizen evidenced an otherwise unexpressed willing-
ness to sever allegiance, Congress could unilaterally declare the
expatriating option exercised by its individual holder.57 Although
titled and couched in terms of "expatriation," the Act of 1907 rees-
tablished58 denationalization as a state prerogative while paying
lip service to the element of individual choice which otherwise
distinguishes expatriation from other loss of citizenship.59 The
focus of legal debate would hereafter be upon the power of Con-
gress, not the right of the individual, to terminate citizenship.60
Endorsement for this legislative approach was soon provided by
the Supreme Court. In Mackenzie v. Hare,61 the Court conceded
that "a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that
is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen."62 Neverthe-
less, the Court found that the Act of 1907 encompassed sufficient
consent when it made loss of citizenship the result of "a condition
voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences." 63
56. See text accompanying notes 12-43 supra.
57. Section 2 of the 1907 Act first speaks of a citizen being "deemed to have
expatriated himself." Later on it says, "[Ilt shall be presumed that he ceased to
be an American citizen . . . ." Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). Section 3 does not
even expressly address loss but speaks of how, after marriage to a foreigner, a wo-
man can "resume her American citizenship." Id. (emphasis added). But see Mac-
kenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). Section 3 was repealed by the Act of Sept. 22,
1922, ch. 411, § 7, 42 Stat. 1022.
58. In effect, the Expatriation Act of 1907 revived the legislative precedent set
by the Act of 1865, see text accompanying note 33 supra, in which Congress estab-
lished that certain acts, other than express renunciation, could result in loss of cit-
izenship as a matter of law. In 1865, it was desertion. By 1907, marriage to a
foreigner was sufficient. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 324; Hurst, Can Congress
Take Away Citizenship?, 29 RocKY MouNTAnw L. REV. 62, 65 (1956).
59. See note 4 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 61-65, 83-129 infra.
61. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
62. Id. at 311.
63. Id. at 312. In Mackenzie, a cooperative Court was willing to conclude that
Two distinct rationales provided the basis for the Supreme
Court's decision in Mackenzie. The first limited the role of the in-
dividual in his own expatriation by recognizing that Congress had
the power to create the inference of his assent. The government
could thus statutorily redefine the requisite act of will by a citizen
as nothing more than his performance of an act designated by
Congress, with prior constructive knowledge and without du-
ress.64 The second rationale employed by the court in Mackenzie
identified as an attribute of sovereignty the authority of Congress
to denationalize without the assent of the citizen whenever the
government reasonably concluded that such action was made
necessary by conditions of national moment.65
THE NATIONALITY ACT OF 1940 AND ITS SUCCESSORS: THE
DEVELOPING TECHNIQUE OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTION
Congress expanded the scope of expatriation by implication
when it subsequently revised and codified the law governing nat-
uralization and citizenship. The Nationality Act of 194066 not only
provided for loss of citizenship as a result of naturalization in a
foreign state,67 as had its 1907 predecessor, 68 but it also man-
dated denationalization for an American citizen who served in the
armed forces69 or government of a foreign power,70 voted in a
the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner was "tantamount to expatria-
tion." Id. at 312. Although apparently sensitive to the lexicological abuse done to
the word "expatriation" by its usage in the 1907 Act, the Court nevertheless up-
held the statute. No specific intent to expatriate herself was required of Mrs. Mac-
kenzie. In fact, as the Court later acknowledged, "[t]he woman had not intended
to give up her American citizenship." Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 501
(1950). Sufficient acquiescence in her denationalization was found in Mrs. Mac-
kenzie's willingness to perform an act to which Congress had legislatively affixed
the consequence of loss of citizenship. See also Ex parte Ng Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670
(W.D. Wash. 1925); Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445, 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1916). In Perkins v.
Elg, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act of 1907 did not operate to dena-
tionalize the American-born daughter of Swedish nationals who had returned with
their daughter to their homeland. Her acquisition of Swedish citizenship through
her parents did not result in the loss of her United States citizenship during her
minority. "As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship
must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the opera-
tion of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conform-
ity with applicable legal principles." 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939).
It would appear that although the Court would limit the Act of 1907 (or at least
§ 2 thereof) to voluntary denationalization, it would also recognize an independent
congressional power to take away citizenship. Note the word "or" used in the
quoted portion. Contra, 41 Op. ATr'y GEN. 86 (1951).
64. 239 U.S. at 311-12.
65. Id.
66. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, reenacted as the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 267 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1101-503) (1976).
67. Ch. 876, § 401(a), 54 Stat. 1137, 1168 (1940).
68. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
69. Ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (1940).
70. Id. § 401(d).
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foreign election,71 committed treason,72 or deserted from the
armed forces of the United States.73 A separate section created a
presumption of expatriation in the case of dual citizens living for
extended periods in their homeland.74
The provisions in the Act of 1940 governing loss of citizenship
underwent little or no change in the recodification of immigration
and naturalization law by Congress in 1952.75 Two years later,
Congress passed the Expatriation Act of 1954.76 To the existing
statutory provision77 for loss of citizenship by one convicted of
committing treason, attempting to overthrow the government by
force, or bearing arms against the United States,7 8 the new law
added denationalization for conviction under the Smith Act.79 An
71. Id. § 401(e).
72. Id. § 401(h). "Committing any act of treason against, or attempting by
force to overthrow or bearing arms against the United States, providing he is con-
victed by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction." This subsection
was not part of the original draft code drawn up by the Executive, nor was it in-
cluded in the House bill, H.R. 9980. It was subsequently added by the Senate, S.
REP. No. 2150, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940) and the amendment was unopposed by
the House, 86 CONG. REc. 13234-40 (1940).
73. Ch. 876, § 401(g), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (1940). Like the portion of the 1907 Act
challenged by Mrs. Mackenzie, supra note 57, subsections (h) and (g) of the 1940
Act did not even require emigration but could denationalize a citizen who had not
even left the country.
74. Ch. 876, § 402, 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (1940).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 801 became 8 U.S.C. § 1481 by the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.
76. Ch. 1256, 68 Stat. 1146. President Eisenhower said in his State of the Union
Address:
We should recognize by law a fact that is plain to all thoughtful citizens-
that we are dealing here with actions akin to treason-that when a citizen
knowingly participates in the Communist conspiracy he no longer holds
allegiance to the United States.
I recommend that Congress enact legislation to provide that a citizen of
the United States who is convicted in the courts of hereafter conspiring to
advocate the overthrow of this Government by force or violence be treated
as having, by such act, renounced his allegiance to the United States and
forfeited his United States citizenship.
Pub. Papers (January 7, 1954), reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3926, 3926.
Deputy Attorney General Rogers wrote to Speaker of the House Martin that the
ensuing bill would be "a statutory recognition of the plain fact that citizens who
knowingly participate in the Communist Conspiracy no longer hold allegiance to
the United States" Letter (Jan. 2, 1954), reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3925, 3926.
77. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(h), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (current version
at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (7) (Supp. H 1978)).
78. See note 72 supra.
79. 18 U.S.C. § § 2383-2385 (1976).
American citizen thereafter would lose his citizenship upon con-
viction for having participated in rebellion or insurrection,8 0 hav-
ing engaged in seditious conspiracy,81 or having advocated the
violent overthrow of the government. 82
MODERN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON Loss OF CITIZENSHIP
After the passage of the Expatriation Act of 1954, the spotlight
of expatriation law again passed from the Congress to the judici-
ary. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld in Perez
v. Brownel183 the denationalization of an American citizen who
had voted in a foreign election.84
As in Mackenzie v. Hare,8 5 the issue was the power of Congress
to legislate loss of citizenship.8 6 The Court held in Perez that
Congress had the power to denationalize an American citizen
who voted in a foreign election.87 Again the Court was willing to
endorse congressional denationalization, but the opinion by Jus-
tice Frankfurter forebore any reliance on an expatriation ration-
ale embodying implied assent.8 8 It was a distortion of Mackenzie,
concluded the Perez court, to rest that decision on the theory that
"a citizen's assent to denationalization may be inferred from his
having engaged in conduct that amounts to an 'abandonment of
citizenship .... , "89
The decision in Perez instead rested on the alternative rationale
80. Id. § 2383.
81. Id. § 2384.
82. Id. § 2385.
83. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
84. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169, subsequently in-
corporated into § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163, 267-268, and repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-432, § § 2, 4, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978).
85. 239 U.S. 299 (1915). See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra. In
Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950), the Court held that a woman who
voluntarily obtained Italian citizenship and thereafter lived abroad lost her Ameri-
can citizenship under either § 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat.
1228, or § 401(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139.
There is nothing ... in the Act of 1907 that implies a congressional intent
that, after an American citizen has performed an overt act which spells
expatriation under the wording of the statute, he, nevertheless, can pre-
serve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his intent or under-
standing to have been contrary to the usual legal consequences of such an
act.
338 U.S. at 500.
86. 356 U.S. at 51.
87. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1169, as amended by Act of
Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 415, 58 Stat. 745.
88. See note 63 supra.
89. 356 U.S. at 61. 'Those two cases [Mackenzie and Savorgnan, see note 85
supra] mean nothing-indeed, they are deceptive-if their essential significance is
not rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate citizenship de-
pends upon the citizen's assent." Id.
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suggested by Mackenzie: that Congress had, as an attribute of
sovereignty, denationalizing power exclusive of expatriation.90
Because Congress possessed the implied constitutional power to
regulate international affairs, it could legislatively withdraw citi-
zenship from one who engaged in acts that might embarrass the
national government in the diplomatic arena or put the country in
a position of potential conflict abroad.91 After Perez, the constitu-
tional boundaries of loss of citizenship clearly included both ex-
patriation and unilateral legislative denationalization. 92
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Perez, found the statute fa-
tally defective because it employed a classification so broad that
it failed to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship.9 3 War-
ren argued that implied assent by the individual was required for
citizenship to be lost.9 4 The Chief Justice could find no congres-
sional power to unilaterally denationalize in the letter or spirit of
the Constitution.9 5 Moreover, the "priceless right" of citizenship
had been rendered immune to the exercise of governmental pow-
ers by the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Loss of citizen-
ship was thereafter limited to the joint action of the state and the
individual.96
90. Id. at 57-58. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
91. 356 U.S. at 59.
92. Justice Frankfurter's approach to the significance of individual acquies-
cence to loss of citizenship brought expatriation law full circle to the Act of 1865
and its naked exercise of sovereign power. See text accompanying notes 34-35
supra.
93. 356 U.S. at 78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 68.
95. Id. at 77-78.
96. Id. The dispute between Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren in
Perez over the legitimate scope of denationalization is significant for two reasons:
first, both opinions left the Court's decision in Mackenzie v. Hare intact. Macken-
zie endorsed the assertion by Congress that voluntariness by implication was suf-
ficient for expatriation. Justice Frankfurter, however, went one step further and
recognized congressional denationalization with no stricter requirement or volun-
tariness than freedom from duress. Chief Justice Warren, referring to the provi-
sion for resumption of citizenship in § 3 of the 1907 Act, see note 57 supra,
distinguished Mackenzie as not pertaining to loss of citizenship at all, but merely
to its abeyance. 356 U.S. at 72. More realistically, he was willing to acknowledge
that "actions short of express renunciation might be so inconsistent with the re-
tention of citizenship as to result in loss of that status." Id. at 78. The low thresh-
old of voluntariness established by Mackenzie could survive regardless of which
Perez position ultimately prevailed.
Perez is also significant because it marks the emergence of the fourteenth
amendment as a possible check on congressional denationalization. Although Jus-
tice Frankfurter professed to find it inapplicable to the question of how citizenship
might be lost, id. at 58, Chief Justice Warren regarded its crystallization of the
In Trop v. Dulles,9 7 the Court again split five to four, but this
time held unconstitutional section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of
1940,98 which provided for loss of citizenship upon conviction of
desertion in time of war. Chief Justice Warren now wrote in the
majority, but to the extent that he would base the Trop decision
on the impotence of Congress to legislate loss of citizenship,99 he
still failed to sway a majority of the Court.o00 The majority in
Trop could agree only that whatever power Congress might have
to remove one's citizenship, it could not employ denationalization
as a punishment.10 '
In Schneider v. Rusk,102 the Court found violative of due pro-
cess section 352(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,103 which denationalized; any naturalized I citizen 1 who re-
turned to reside in his or her homeland for three years or more.
Unable to agree on the existence of congressional power to unilat-
erally take away citizenship,O4 the Schneider majority neverthe-
less found that the statute discriminated against naturalized
citizens based upon the impermissible assumption that they were
less reliable and bore less allegiance to the United States than did
native-born citizens. 0 5
rights of citizenship as preemptive of any recognition by the Court of an implied
governmental power to take away nationality. Id. at 77-78.
97. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
98. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1168, 1169, as amended, Act of Jan. 20, 1944, ch. 2, 58 Stat. 4.
99. 356 U.S. at 91-93.
100. Justices Black and Douglas agreed as they had in Perez, 356 U.S. at 79-84,
that involuntary denationalization was beyond the power of Congress, 356 U.S. at
104. Justice Whittaker without comment in Trop reversed his previous opinion in
Perez that Congress could unilaterally take away citizenship, 356 U.S. at 84. Jus-
tice Brennan joined in finding the statute unconstitutional in Trop, but continued
to agree with Justice Frankfurter's Perez analysis. 356 U.S. at 86.
101. 356 U.S. at 101 (Warren, C.J.), 104 (Black, J., concurring), 105 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), where the
Court held § 401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940 and its successor, § 349(a) (10) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, unconstitutional. The statutes pro-
vided for loss of citizenship by those who remained abroad to avoid the draft in
time of war. The Court found the statutes to be essentially penal and therefore
unconstitutional because they operated without the procedural guarantees of the
fifth and sixth amendments. 372 U.S. at 165-66.
102. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
103. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 169.
104. 377 U.S. at 166.
105. Id. at 168. In dissent Justice Clark relied upon Mackenzie, see text accom-
panying notes 61-65 supra, in arguing that Congress had the power to make loss of
citizenship the consequence of extended sojourn in one's homeland. "[Mrs.
Schneider, like Mrs. Mackenzie] with her eyes open to the result, chose by her ac-
tion to renounce her ... citizenship." 377 U.S. at 169 (Clark, J., dissenting). Con-
gress could legitimately discriminate against the class of naturalized citizens
herein as it had discriminated against women in the statute upheld in Mackenzie.
Id. at 170. Indeed, here was a distinction more clearly pertaining to divided alle-
giance which was, according to Mackenzie, the central issue in expatriation cases.
Id. at 176.
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DENATIONALIZATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The turning point for congressional denationalization came nine
years later in Afroyim v. Rusk106 when the Court in still another
five-to-four split held that the Constitution did not empower Con-
gress to deprive a person of his citizenship simply because he had
voted in a foreign election. 0 7 Justice Black wrote the decision,
finding that the fourteenth amendment with its sweeping grant of
citizenship would not countenance government action that would
take away citizenship without the concurrence of the citizen.OB
Perez v. Brownell was expressly overruled.109
The Court in Afroyim clearly discarded the radical view that
congressional denationalization is limited only by the require-
ment of a rational nexus to a specific constitutional power." 0
But what of Justice McKenna's conclusion in Mackenzie that suf-
ficient voluntariness could exist to legitimize legislative denation-
alization absent a specific intention on the part of the individual
106. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See Duvall, Expatriation under United States Law,
Perez to Afroyimi: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L
REV. 408 (1970).
107. 387 U.S. at 267.
108. Id. at 267-68.
To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he
voted in a foreign election in violation of § 401(e) would be equivalent to
holding that Congress has the power to "abridge," "affect," "restrict the ef-
fect of," and 'take ... away" citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prevents Congress from doing any of these things, we agree with
THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissent in the Perez case that the Government is
without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under § 401(e).
Id. (footnote deleted).
109. Id.at 268. In dissent Justice Harlan repeated Justice Frankfurter's Perez
analysis of the effect of the fourteenth amendment on expatriation. Silent on how
citizenship might be lost, it was simply inapplicable. Id. at 292. The first sentence
of the fourteenth amendment did no more than state a nonexclusive list of the
ways in which American citizenship was acquired, especially by negroes. Id. at
283-85. Congress could not have believed it was placing citizenship beyond its
reach with the fourteenth amendment because it contemporaneously passed laws
and ratified treaties which incorporated provisions for involuntary denationaliza-
tion. Id. at 285-92. Only four years later, congressional power was again ascen-
dant. In Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), the foreign-born son of an American
citizen lost his "derivative" citizenship When he failed to live continuously for five
years in the United States before his twenty-eighth birthday as required by stat-
ute. Justice Blackmun wrote for yet another five-to-four Court. Appellant was
neither born in the United States nor naturalized within its boundaries, but rather
was a citizen by act of Congress. Id. at 830-31. On its face, therefore, the four-
teenth amendment simply did not apply. Id. at 827-28.
110. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958). See text accompanying notes 90-
92 supra.
to renounce his citizenship?"' Such a conclusion would appear
to be antithetical to the concern expressed by the Afroyim Court
for the uninhibited operation of the fourteenth amendment as a
citizenship guarantee," 2 yet Afroyim stopped short of overruling
Mackenzie. Afroyim said Congress had no implied power to uni-
laterally take away citizenship recognized by the fourteenth
amendment;" 3 Afroyim did not say that Congress could not ac-
complish the same result by defining an individual's performance
of a given act as demonstrative of his assent to the loss of his citi-
zenship. n4
SPECIFIC INTENT AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
The Court in Afroyim professed to adopt Chief Justice War-
ren's dissent in Perez,"5 but in his Perez dissent, Warren was
willing to infer an individual's acquiescence from actions other
than express renunciation." 6 Afroyim eliminated unilateral leg-
islative denationalization, but did not rule out legislatively in-
ferred individual assent to expatriation. Because the issue of
legitimate congressional power within the context of expatriation
was not considered," 7 the Court did not examine the Mackenzie
conclusion that specific intent to expatriate was not required of
the citizen." 8 One conclusion that may be drawn is that when
Afroyim overruled Perez, expatriation law returned to the pre-Pe-
rez rule of voluntariness expressed in Mackenzie in 1916.119
111. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915). See text accompanying note
64 supra.
112. Afroyir v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
113. See discussion of Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), note 109 supra.
114. "Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his
own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he volunta-
rily relinquishes that citizenship." 387 U.S. at 268.
115. Id.at 267.
116. "It has long been recognized that citizenship may not only be voluntarily
renounced through exercise of the right of expatriation but also by other actions
in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 68 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citing Mackenzie v. Hare).
117. 387 U.S. at 255.
118. When the Court's opinion in Afroyim does speak of an expatriation alter-
native, the variety of words chosen to express the nature of the individual's act of
will reveals the Court's ambivalence toward the scope of that right: "voluntary re-
nunciation," id., "voluntarily renounced or given up," id. at 256, "assent," id. at
263, "voluntary renunciation or abandonment," id. at 266, and "voluntarily relin-
quishes," id. at 268.
119. See Jolley v. I.N.S., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971), where the court refused to
find that one who renounced his American citizenship because he morally op-
posed the draft surrendered his citizenship under duress. "His renunciation was
therefore the product of personal choice and consequently voluntary." Id. at 1250
(footnote deleted). The dissent considered the real question to be the intention of
the citizen himselfi Id. at 1256 (Rives, J., dissenting).
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This low threshold and objective standard of voluntariness was
rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. Matheson.120
The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Afroyim mandated proof of a specific intent for expatriation.' 21
The Matheson court based its conclusion on the significance of
citizenship as a constitutional right insured by the fourteenth
amendment, a point first accepted by the Supreme Court in
Afroyim. 122 The requirement of specific intent on the part of the
expatriate reflects the growing judicial trend to construe conduct
as a waiver or forfeiture of a constitutional right only when it is
clearly and intelligently intended as such.'23
Whether or not the Matheson court was correct in its conclu-
sion that Afroyim explicitly rejected earlier cases applying an ob-
jective test to discover the intent of the expatriate,124 its opinion
did recognize the new factor that Afroyim introduced to judicial
analysis of denationalization legislation. 25 Acceptance by the
Supreme Court of the concept that the fourteenth amendment
protects citizenship from governmental confiscation profoundly
alters the nature of judicial review from the Mackenzie-Perez con-
text. As Matheson concludes, it may have changed the essence of
the act of will required of the individual for expatriation. 2 6 It
certainly must alter the role of the courts in passing on legislation
effecting loss of citizenship.
The Mackenzie and Perez Courts deferred to congressional de-
cisions concerning what behavior would bear the inference of in-
120. 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
121. Id. at 814-15. In Matheson, the executor sought to avoid U.S. taxation of
the estate by proving the expatriation of the testatrix. She had married a Mexican
national, signed a certificate declaring her allegiance to Mexico, and travelled
under both U.S. and Mexican passports. The court found such evidence iqsuffi-
cient for expatriation.
Because Mrs. Burns was a United States citizen by birth, she could not lose her
citizenship in the absence of proof that she intentionally relinquished it. Id. See
also Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978), prob. juris noted, 435 U.S. 970
(1979); Note, Terrazas v. Vance and the Standard of Proof in Expatriation Pro-
ceedings: Resolving the Ambiguity of Voluntariness, 65 VA. L. REV. 713 (1979). "It
seems to us absolutely inconsistent with the spirit of Afroyim to conclude that
Congress somehow retains the power to define in the way it has here the condi-
tions under which an individual is said to have relinquished voluntarily that citi-
zenship." 577 F.2d at 10. See also King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 1972).
122. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
123. 532 F.2d at 814.
124. See note 118 supra.
125. 532 F.2d at 814. See note 96 and text accompanying note 108 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
dividual acquiescence in loss of citizenship. In Mackenzie, the
Court took for granted the deleterious international repercussions
of the legislatively designated expatriating act. 2 7 The Perez
Court only refused to deny Congress the reasonable belief that
the designated act might well have consequences "jeopardizing
the successful conduct of international relations."' 28 In light of
the Court's subsequent recognition of the status of citizenship as
a fundamental right, such deference is no longer appropriate.
When congressional action is alleged to interfere with individual
rights expressly insured by the Constitution, modern concepts of
judicial review require independent analysis by the Court.129 At
least two categories of individual action currently resulting in loss
of citizenship could not withstand independent fundamental
rights analysis.
THE STATE OF THE STATUTE: CURRENT DENATIONALIZATION
LEGIsLATION
Today, a citizen may lose his citizenship by operation of statute
as a result of performance of one of five kinds of actions:30 ex-
press renunciation of United States citizenship,131 naturalization
by a foreign state,132 formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign
state, 33 service in the armed forces of a foreign state,134 or convic-
tion of a crime against United States allegiance.135 Express re-
nunciation by its very nature transcends the issue of implied
127. 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915).
128. 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958).
129. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
130. In 1976, Congress repealed § 349(a) (10) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, belatedly bowing to the Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Court had held that a statute denationaliz-
ing persons who remained abroad to avoid the draft was penal in nature and
unconstitutional because it ignored the procedural guarantees of the fifth and
sixth amendments. Id. at 167. In 1978 Congress repealed the provisions found un-
constitutional in Trop, Schneider, and Afroyim. See notes 97-101, 102-05, 106-08 and
accompanying text supra.
A sixth category apparently exists in 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4) (1976), which dena-
tionalizes a U.S. citizen who takes employment with a foreign government. Be-
cause subparagraph (A) is limited to government employment requiring change of
nationality and because subparagraph (B) is limited to government employment
requiring an oath of allegiance, § 1481(a) (4) does not reach any class of U.S. citi-
zens not already subject to loss of citizenship under § 1481 (a) (1) or § 1481 (a) (2).
131. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (5), (6) (Supp. 1979).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1) (1976).
133. Id. § 1481(a) (2).
134. Id. § 1481(a)(3).
135. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (7) (Supp. 1979). See note 72 and text accompanying
notes 76-82 supra.
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voluntariness.136 The intent of the expatriate is made clear by
his own words. In the other four cases, however, the individual's
expression of voluntariness must be implied if the Constitution
requires that a citizen be a willing partner in his own denationali-
zation.
These four remaining expatriation acts may be divided into
three classes. The first consists of acts which are natural steps to-
ward cementing a new bond between the individual and another
state. Seeking naturalization elsewhere or taking a foreign oath
of allegiance both reasonably suggest a preference on the part of
the individual for another allegiance.137 Because the two acts
are, by their very nature, so directly related to citizenship and al-
legiance, they may support the implication of either Mackenzie
voluntariness or Matheson specific intent to expatriate. 38
Such a conclusion by a post-Afroyim court would require two
prior determinations. First, the court would have to find that the
state's interest in avoiding dual nationality among its citizens was
sufficiently compelling to justify an inference of expatriation.139
Second, the court would have to find that congressional reliance
on an inference was necessary because the individual's intention
to expatriate could not be more directly deternmined.140
The second class of acts from which expatriation can be cur-
136. Even the most ardent admirer of fourteenth amendment safeguards will
not object to a statutory acknowledgment that the government will acquiesce in
the wishes of the individual expressly and formally manifested to its representa-
tives. As long as congressional acknowledgment by statute of a means of expatria-
tion is not viewed as limiting, there should be no objection from the parties on
either side of the constitutional debate. The fear that such "legislative notice" of a
particular method of expatriation might be construed as exclusive has in the past
been fatal to congressional legislative attempts on the subject. See the debate sur-
rounding a bill offered into the House in 1817. F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGSL.ATIVE HIs-
TORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 142-60 (1906).
137. As Chief Justice Warren noted, "Any action by which he manifests alle-
giance to a foreign state may be so inconsistent with the retention of citizenship
as to result in loss of that status." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958) (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting).
138. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-36 (1952); Savorgnan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 491, 498 (1950); Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445, 450-51 (N.D.N.Y.
1916); Borchard, Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation,
25 Am. J. INT'L L. 312, 315 (1931); Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE
L.J. 693, 707 (1921); Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 427 (1949). But see United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 811, 815-16 (2d
Cir. 1976).
139. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
140. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964). See also J. No-
rently inferred encompasses a limited number of activities else-
where defined as criminal.141 Indeed, a criminal conviction
thereof is a prerequisite under the statute.142 The foremost
member of this expatriating class is treason, the most serious of
all crimes143 and the only one defined by the Constitution it-
self."'" The others are sedition 145 and seditious conspiracy, 46
insurrection, 47 and advocating the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment."48
Treason is, generally speaking, a breach of allegiance to a gov-
ernment committed by a person who owes allegiance to it,149 al-
though the federal offense as constitutionally defined is
considerably narrower.150 Allegiance is the citizen's obligation of
fidelity and obedience to the government, arising in exchange for
the protection afforded the citizen by his government.' 5 1 To the
extent that all the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) (7) of the
statute governing loss of citizenship share the common gravamen
of an effort to subvert the government or aid its enemies,152 they
are all acts deleterious to allegiance, differing from "treason" only
in seriousness 153 and proof.154
Congress has statutorily defined as expatriating acts the crimes
WAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410 (1978); L. TAME, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-30 (1978).
141. 8 U.S.C. § § 2381, 2383, 2385 (1976).
142. "[A] person who is a national of the United States ... shall lose his nation-
ality .... if and when he is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of
competent jurisdiction. . . ." 8 U.S.CA. § 1481(a) (7) (Supp. 1979).
143. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 347 (1870); Stephan v. United
States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781 (1943).
Under the laws of the United States, the highest of all crimes is treason.
It must be so in every civilized state; not only because the first duty of a
state is self-preservation, but because this crime naturally leads to and in-
volves many other [sic], destructive of the safety of individuals and of the
peace and welfare of society.
Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws and Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1024, 1025 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1851) (No. 18,269).
144. '"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 2383 (1976).
146. Id. § 2384.
147. Id. § 2383.
148. Id. § 2385.
149. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 62 (1877); United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 2383 (1976).
151. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872).
152. Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARv. L. REV. 395, 421 (1945).
153. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 347 (1870); Stephan v. United
States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781 (1943).
154. U.S. CoNsT. art. IJ, § 3, cl. 2.
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listed under subsection (a) (7). They are therefore proffered as
proof of an individual's desire to lose his citizenship. The rele-
vant link to the termination of allegiance is their nature as acts
violative of allegiance. Whether the court, upon independent
analysis, would find that an expatriating intent or assent could be
reasonably inferred from a breach of allegiance would depend in
part upon the court's willingness to equate breach of allegiance
with rescission of allegiance. An act violative of the relationship
between citizen and State need not express the actor's intent to
permanently sever his allegiance and abjure his relationship. The
seriousness of the offense, especially in cases of treason or insur-
rection, might well provide sufficient support for the opposite con-
clusion.
Two difficulties remain in justifying a congressional inference of
expatriating intent from the acts designated under subsection
(a) (7). No compelling state interest is served when Congress
makes the inference. The threat that existed to the security of
the United States or to its relations abroad is, by the time the
statute operates to imply expatriation, a fait accompli. The citizen
has been convicted and is in the custody of the state. The con-
gressional inference lacks the justification of a preventive objec-
tive. Moreover, the inference need not be drawn as a matter of
necessity because the citizen is readily available to supply a more
concrete expression of his intent.
The third category of acts from which an expatriating inference
can be drawn under current legislation includes acts distinguisha-
ble from other legislatively expatriating actions by the absence of
any relationship between the act performed and allegiance. Un-
authorized foreign military service 55 need not create a new alle-
giance, nor need it breach an existing one. The absence of
Executive approval, which alone distinguishes the expatriating
act from other military exchange programs encouraged by the
state, is not sufficient to modify the relationship between citizen
and state. The Nationality Act of 1940,156 the predecessor to the
current subsection dealing with foreign military service, required
that the expatriate acquire the nationality of his employer. The
current statute, introduced as part of the Immigration and Nation-
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1976); see De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D.
Conn. 1942). Contra, Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1963), afl'd sub nom.
Marks v. Kennedy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
156. Ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169.
ality Act of 1952,157 is overly broad for its failure to retain such a
limitation. In the absence of some potential for modification of
nationality or allegiance, the expatriating inference cannot be
drawn.
CONCLUSION
The history of expatriation law in the United States makes it
clear that an American citizen can renounce his citizenship and
thereby eliminate his obligation of loyalty and obedience to the
state. The government, however, does not enjoy that same free-
dom of action. The state cannot unilaterally disrupt the relation-
ship between itself and its fourteenth amendment citizens, but it
can acquiesce in the expatriating act of the individual.
In the absence of express renunciation, the element of volunta-
riness, which distinguishes expatriation from other types of dena-
tionalization traditionally available to the state, is not so clearly
evident. Since 1907, Congress has inferred an intent to expatriate
from a variety of specific actions. The technique was endorsed by
the Supreme Court in Mackenzie v. Hare, a decision of reemerg-
ing importance in the wake of Afroyim v. Rusk. Afroyim made
clear that denationalization is limited by the Constitution to expa-
triation; that is, to loss of citizenship that is voluntary. Afroyim
did not make clear, however, what type of act of the will consti-
tutes sufficient voluntariness for expatriation.
In addition to terminating unilateral legislative denationaliza-
tion, Afroyim also expressly recognized citizenship as a funda-
mental constitutional right. This newly recognized status is as yet
largely unexplored in its significance to both the type of consent
required of an individual for his or her expatriation and the de-
gree of scrutiny to which statutory conclusions about expatriation
will be subjected. To the extent that fundamental-rights analysis
in the citizenship context follows previous applications, independ-
ent judicial evaluation of congressional decisions can be expected.
The inference of an expatriating intent from performance of an
action by an individual will be sustained only to the extent that it
is reasonable, necessary, and directed to an important state inter-
est. Current legislation attaching an expatriating intent to actions
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1976). Other employment with a foreign govern-
mental entity is not sufficient by itself for denationalization of a United States citi-
zen. The statute additionally requires the American employee who would
expatriate himself to either assume his employer's nationality or make an oath of
allegiance to his employer. See note 130 supra. Thus an American soldiering
abroad faces denationalization, but an American serving with a foreign inteli-
gence organization, police department, or internal security group does not by that
service alone.
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that do not produce an alternative allegiance cannot pass such ex-
amination.
ADDENDUM
After this Comment was written, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Vance v. Terrazas.5 8 As expected, the Court
addressed the issue of whether Congress had the power to legis-
late the evidentiary standard for loss of citizenship embodied in 8
U.S.C. § 1481(c);159 namely, that proof of an expatriating act under
section 1481(a) must be established by a preponderance of the ev-
idence. The Court went on, however, to consider the separate
question of whether specific intent to renounce citizenship must
be proven after Afroyim.16o Neither the district court nor the Sev-
enth Circuit had taken exception to the government's proof of in-
tent on the part of Terrazas to renounce his United States
citizenship.161 In an opinion by Justice White, the Court never-
theless asserted that specific intent to renounce must be shown in
addition to performance of one of the specific acts enumerated in
section 1481(a).162
Laurence Terrazas was born in the United States, the son of a
Mexican citizen.163 He therefore possessed dual nationality, be-
ing a citizen of the United States and of Mexico. At the age of
twenty-two, while a student in Monterrey, Mexico, Terrazas ap-
plied for a certificate of Mexican nationality. In his application,
he expressly renounced his United States citizenship and swore
"adherence, obedience and submission to the laws and authori-
ties of the Mexican Republic."164 The Department of State subse-
quently issued a certificate of loss of nationality despite Terrazas'
objection. After a full hearing, the Board of Appellate Review of
the Department of State affirmed the finding that Terrazas had
voluntarily renounced his United States citizenship. 65 Terrazas
then sued to regain his citizenship.166
158. 48 U.SJL.W. 4069 (1980).
159. (1976).
160. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1966). See text accompanying notes 106-28
supra.
161. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4071.
162. Id. at 4071-72.
163. Id. at 4070.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
The district court found for the Secretary of State, holding that
a dual national will be deemed to have expatriated himself when
it is shown that he voluntarily committed an act whereby he un-
equivocally renounced his allegiance to the United States.16 7 The
court found that Terrazas had knowingly and voluntarily taken an
oath of allegiance to Mexico and concurrently renounced alle-
giance to the United States; he had therefore "voluntarily relin-
quished United States citizenship pursuant to section
1481(a) (2).,,168
Upon review, the Seventh Circuit reversed. 69 Without ques-
tioning the sufficiency of the Secretary's proof of Terrazas' intent
to expatriate himself, the appellate court took exception to the ev-
identiary standard embodied in section 1481(c) and held that un-
der Afroyim, the Constitution required proof of an expatriating
act under section 1481(a) by "clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence."170 The case was remanded to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings; meanwhile, the Secretary appealed.
Before the Supreme Court, the Secretary argued that the Sev-
enth Circuit had erroneously required proof of specific intent to
renounce United States citizenship.'71 Although the issue had not
been raised in the jurisdictional statement, the Supreme Court
nevertheless elected to respond to the unanswered question of
Afroyim: what is the nature of the individual's assent that the
Court in Afroyim held was a prerequisite for loss of citizenship?
For the Secretary, it was enough that he prove only the voluntary
commission of an act so inherently inconsistant with continued
retention of United States citizenship that Congress could accord
to it its natural consequences; namely, loss of citizenship.17 2 All
but one of the Justices agreed that "assent" meant at least the in-
tent to relinquish citizenship. 7 3 For the majority, that specific in-
tent could be "expressed in words or found as a fair inference
from proven conduct." 74 Proof that a citizen voluntarily per-
formed one of the expatriating acts specified in section 1481(a)
will not be treated as conclusive evidence of the assent of the citi-
zen to the loss of his citizenship, although in a particular case it
might be highly persuasive evidence of a purpose to abandon citi-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 4071.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 4071, 4074 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
4074-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 4075 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. at 4071.
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zenship. 7 5
With respect to the evidentiary standard of section 1481(c), the
Court found that neither the citizenship clause nor the due proc-
ess clause dictated requirements of proof beyond a preponder-
ance of the evidence in expatriation proceedings which are civil in
nature and do not threaten loss of liberty.176 The Court noted
that section 1481(c) had been enacted by Congress in response to
the Court's holding in Nishikawa v. Dulles177 that the party as-
serting loss of citizenship bore the burden of proving that the ex-
patriating act was voluntarily performed.178 The Nishikawa
holding, however, had not been grounded in the Constitution, and
the Court had expressly noted that it was acting in the absence of
legislative guidance. 7 9 Congress was free to restore to expatria-
tion proceedings the normal presumption of voluntariness.180 The
Court herein carefully distinguished voluntariness, to which the
presumption attaches, from specific intent to expatriate, a distinct
element which cannot be presumed but which must be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 1
Justice Marshall agreed with the Court that specific intent was
required for expatriation, but concluded with Justice Stevens that
the potential consequences of loss of citizenship were sufficiently
grave as to require for due process a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof. 1 82 Justice Stevens, because he could find no justifi-
cation for imposing the requirement of proving specific intent to
expatriate, absent language to that effect, concluded that Con-
gress had failed to establish a permissible standard for expatria-
tion in section 1481(a) (2).183 Both Justice Brennan and Justice
Stewart dissented because they could not find an act inconsistent
with continued United States allegiance in the taking of an oath
of loyalty to another country of which an individual is a citizen
but a dual national.184 Justice Brennan went on to assert his be-
175. Id. at 4072 (quoting Justice Black's concurring opinion in Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958)).
176. Id. at 4073.
177. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
178. 48 U.SJ.W. at 4073.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4074 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 4074-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 4075-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
lief that American citizenship could be lost only by formal renun-
ciation in accordance with the procedures established by
Congress. 8 5
Terrazas attempts to solve the dilemma created by Afroyim
with respect to proof of expatriation.186 Afroyim made it clear
that loss of citizenship could not occur absent the "assent" of the
individual.187 It is now clear that as a matter of law, the assent of
the citizen cannot be presumed from his voluntary performance
of an act identified by Congress as expatriating. There has been
no post-Afroyim reversion to Mackenzie voluntariness.188 The act
not only must be voluntary, but also must be the result of a spe-
cific intent on the part of the individual to terminate United
States citizenship.
As a practical matter, congressional objectives served by sec-
tion 1481(a) will probably not be frustrated to any degree. The
Court has merely ruled that Congress may not make the logical
deduction of specific intent from a specific act. Coupled with a
relatively relaxed standard of proof,189 the Court's acknowledg-
ment that the requisite intent may be found as a "fair inference
from proven conduct,"' 9 0 allows the trier of fact to do what Con-
gress may not do directly. Indeed, the Court's opinion quoted (as
did the district court) United States v. Matheson,19' when it said,
"the declaration to a foreign state in conjunction with the renun-
ciatory language of United States citizenship 'would leave no
room for ambiguity as to the intent of the applicant.' "192 What re-
mains to be seen is to what extent actions less suggestive than an
oath of allegiance, coupled with an express renunciation, can be
found to evidence the requisite specific intent mandated by Ter-
razas and the fourteenth amendment. 193
J.P. JONES
185. Id.
186. See text accompanying notes 110-23 supra.
187. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4071.
188. See text accompanying notes 111-19 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 176-81 supra.
190. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4071.
191. 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 120-21 supra.
192. 48 U.SJL.W. at 4071.
193. See text accompanying notes 130-57 supra.
